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2 Nicolas T. Courtois
1 Introduction, Non-Linear Cryptanalysis
The concept of cryptanalysis with non-linear polynomials a.k.a. Generalized Linear
Cryptanalysis (GLC) was introduced at Eurocrypt’95, cf. [23]. A key question is
the existence of round-invariant I/O sums: when a value of a certain polynomial is
preserved after 1 round. Such properties are notoriously hard to find [36,8]. There
are 22
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possible invariants and systematic exploration is not feasible [4,5,25,37]. In
this paper and unlike in [36] we focus on invariants which work for 100 % of the keys
and we focus on stronger invariants which hold with probability 1 for one round. In
addition we look at an expensive historical and government cipher where encryption
is substantially more costly than in modern ciphers such as 3DES, AES, cf. [16].
The number of rounds used to encrypt each character is simply very large and most
standard cryptanalytic attacks will simply do not work, or will be very far from being
practically relevant. However all this complexity is not that useful if we can discover
invariant attacks working for any number of rounds.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the philosophy of
the attacks and relation to mathematical theories of invariants and group theory. In
Section 3 we introduce the question on polynomial invariants on ciphers and some
useful notations. In Section 4 we look at the question of Feistel ciphers vs. general
block ciphers. In Section 5 we provide the specification of our block cipher T-310.
In Section 6 we explain that the problem of finding a one-round invariant can be
formalized as the problem of solving the so called Fundamental Equation (FE). In
Section 7 we show several examples of polynomial invariant attacks, some of which
are simple linear attacks. We show how a linear invariantL on one cipher may hide
the existence of another non-linear invariant property P on the same cipher. We
do not stop here: in Section 7.3 we show that an invariant of degree 4 also exists,
and in further sections the simpler invariants will be removed and we keep ONLY
one invariant of degree 4. Then in Section 7.4 we modify the wiring in order to
accommodate a more complex Boolean function. Then in Section 8 we show that
two similar invariants may exist in one single cipher setup. Finally in Section 9 we
will remove all invariants of degree 4 and we will be left with a one single invariant of
degree 8. In few steps a pathologically weak cipher becomes a substantially stronger
cipher and the attack becomes less obvious and harder to discover. In Section 10 and
in Conclusion section we explain what was achieved so far and present some open
problems.
2 Polynomial Invariant Attacks
2.1 Invariant Attacks, Partitioning Cryptanalysis, Linear Subspace Attacks
A general approach in cryptanalysis considers arbitrary subsets of binary vector spaces.
This is called Partitioning Cryptanalysis (PC), cf. [3,24]. Our work is then a special
case: we study only partitions defined by the value (0/1) for a single Boolean polyno-
mial, cf. [8]. This is less general but properties are more intelligible and follow clear
rules of formal algebra. A serious theory is nowadays being developed around what
is possible or not to achieve in partitioning and invariant attacks, cf. [4,37,7].
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In recent research there exist two major types of invariant attacks: linear sub-space
invariants [26,27,4,7], and proper non-linear polynomial invariants [36,8], which are
somewhat more general. In many cases (but not always) two types of attacks are
the same: an attack where the invariant is a product of simple linear polynomials
A,B,C,D, for example P = ABCD in Section 7.3, is also simultaneously a linear
subspace attack. However the most general attack is an attack with a sum of prod-
ucts, for example P = AC+BD in Section 7.2 and it is irreducible so it cannot be
expressed as a single product, and therefore it is not an attack with a linear sub-space
invariant [3,4,37,6]. This demonstrates that the product attack is NOT necessarily
the most powerful attack. In general we work in polynomial rings and both addition
and multiplication are allowed and the polynomialP = AC+BD in Section 7.2 was
verified to be irreducible.
2.2 Invariants vs. Mathematical Theory of [Polynomial] Invariants
A key observation is that a set of all possible invariants for any block cipher is in
general a ring: a sum of two invariants is an invariant. Likewise, a product of two in-
variants gives also another invariant. We have a potentially rich mathematical struc-
ture, a ring. However in many cases this ring seems1 to have only a small number
of elements. One of the reasons for this is that when we multiply various Boolean
functions frequently we get zero (annihilation) or one of the operands (absorption).
This also means that it makes a lot of sense to study these rings as partially ordered
set (or POSETs) with the partial order defined by the usual division of (Boolean)
polynomials. A standard method to represent POSETs are Hasse diagrams, cf. Fig.
2.1 below.
There exists an extensive theory of multivariate polynomial algebraic invariants
[22] which historically, in mathematics, has studied mostly invariants w.r.t. linear
transformations and has rarely studied invariants with more than 5 variables and in
finite fields of small size. In our work we study invariants w.r.t non-linear trans-
formations and 36 or more variables over GF(2). More ample explanations on how
the present work is simultaneously very closely related and yet differs very substan-
tially from questions typically studied by mathematicians in the classical [Hilbertian]
invariant theory can be found in Section 2.4 in [18]. We summarize the main compar-
ison points here. In classical work in maths we have:
1) invariants are polynomials of small degree,
2) they have only 2 sometimes up to 5 variables,
3) polynomials are over large fields and rings, frequently algebraically closed or
infinite (or both), or in fields with large characteristic,
4) invariants should not change when we operate a LINEAR input variable trans-
formation L, a very important limitation,
3+4 makes that there is a scaling scalar or factor σ in most invariants known in clas-
sical mathematics: a determinant of the linear transformation L,
1 This however we are not sure about, in most cases. Additional invariants not anticipated by any
given construction or method such as those studied in this paper, are sometimes discovered, and many
more invariants at higher degree and large complexity could exist, without being efficiently computable or
efficiently detectable by the attacker.
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5) these invariants are in general multivariate polynomials.
The common points with our work on block ciphers are (1) and (5) and there are
very substantial differences as follows:
2’) we work with many more variables forP , typically between 8 and 36 at a time.
3’) we work with GF(2) mainly, which seems to be the best choice,
4’) we work with invariants which remain the same after applying an extremely com-
plex non-linear transformation sometimes called φ , or any power of it φ k with
extra variables which are secret (such as key bits) or public (such as round con-
stants or IV bits).
3+4 Here the scaling factor δ could only be equal to 1 and should be omitted.
2.3 A Group Theoretic Interpretation
The question of invariants is very closely related and also to the study of the groups
generated by various cipher transformations This question was studied for a long
time, since early 1970 in both Eastern Bloc [31,32,33] and in the West, [34,2,11,
12].
Fig. 2.1 Interpretation of our work in terms of walks in group lattices
It is very difficult to know the actual size of a group generated by cryptographic
transformations except that cipher designers have worked very hard for decades on
how to make it extremely large and extremely complex. What is however accessible
to us is to see that certain groups are smaller because each transformation satisfies
a certain invariant. In general different groups generated by different versions of a
cipher will be ordered by inclusion and we get a partially ordered set of groups.
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More generally these groups can be embedded in a larger lattice of groups which do
not need to correspond to a particular version of a cipher, but also characterised by
additional (technical) conditions. Then the whole incremental approach of invariant
hopping which we study in this paper can be interpreted as walks in group lattices.
This is illustrated on Fig. 2.1.
In this paper we will not study this approach in detail. An open problem is to
revisit known result on groups generated by block cipher transformations and at the
same time compute the full invariant ring for each group. This is quite difficult be-
cause currently no efficient method for computing the full invariant ring is known.
2.4 Finding Advanced Invariant Attacks
The primary method proposed in 2018 is through solving the so called Fundamen-
tal Equation or FE cf. [8]. Solving such equation(s), or several such equations si-
multaneously, guarantees that we obtain a Boolean function for our cipher and the
polynomial invariantP which propagates for any number of rounds. However noth-
ing guarantees that the FE equation has any solutions whatsoever. In this paper we
construct polynomial invariants explicitly by modifying something which worked.
A trivial attack on a weak cipher will be transformed into a better or higher degree
invariant attack on a stronger cipher in several steps. We call this method “invariant
hopping” illustrated in Fig. 2.1. The discovery of invariant properties by modifica-
tion of other invariant properties and learning from examples is the main topic of this
paper.
2.5 The Question of Weak Keys and Backdoors
There are numerous constructions of weak ciphers in cryptographic literature, cf. for
example work related to the AES S-box [11,12], and [3,7] including work on choice
of constants in modern hash functions [1,28] which are also based on block ciphers.
In this paper, a weak key or rather a weak long-term key setup is primarily a tool to
find some attack more easily, and the same attack may be transposed to hold also for
another (stronger) cipher setup. In terms of backdoors an interesting question is how
many entries in the truth table of an arbitrary Boolean function need to be altered
in order to make a given polynomial invariant attack work. Recent work suggests
that is some cases this number can be quite low, cf. [9]. This is also what we will
demonstrate in Section 9.
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3 Polynomial Invariants and Block Ciphers
We callP a polynomial invariant if the value ofP is preserved after one round of
encryption, i.e. if
P(Inputs) =P(Outputs).
Another notation is to write that
P =Pφ
wherePφ denotes how our polynomial is transformed by our block cipher, where
one round of our block cipher is denoted by φ(), and and we will later define
Pφ
de f
= P ◦φ =P(φ(Inputs)) =P(Transformed Outputs)
where ◦ is the composition of functions which by convention is applied (in order)
from right to left. However this notation is somewhat ambiguous. On one side it is
possible that it is not well defined because one round of encryption φ depends on
some extra parameters such as key or IV bits. On the other side, the polynomial P
is frequently very carefully chosen by the attacker so that this would not be the case
and numerous variables are already eliminated.
This works for any block cipher except that such attacks are notoriously hard to
find [4] in the last 20 years since [23]. In this paper we are going to work with one
specific block cipher with 36-bit2 blocks. The main point is that any block cipher
round translates into relatively simple Boolean polynomials, if we look at just one
round. We follow the methodology of [8] in order to specify the exact mathematical
constraint, known as the Fundamental Equation or FE, so that we could have a poly-
nomial invariant attack on our cipher. Such an attack will propagate for any number
of rounds (if independent of key and other bits). In addition it makes sense following
[8] to consider that the Boolean function inside the cipher is an unknown. We denote
this function by a special variable Z. We then see that our attack works if and only if
Z is a solution to a certain algebraic equation [with additional variables]. The main
interest of making Z a variable is to find some strong attacks in the cases where the
Boolean function is extremely weak case, (e.g. Z is linear) and transpose them to
stronger ciphers where Z will be increasingly complex.
We discard the attacks when the FE reduces to 0 a nd which work for any Z. It appears
that such attacks are quite rare cf. [8] and our later specific trick or method for finding
new attacks by manipulating the roots of FE would not work.
3.1 Notation and Methodology
In this paper the sign + denotes addition modulo 2, and frequently we omit the sign *
in products. For the sake of compact notation we frequently use short or single letter
variable names. For example let x1, . . . ,x36 be inputs of a block cipher each being
∈ {0,1}. We will avoid this notation and name them with small letters a−z and letters
M−V when we run out of lowercase letters. We follow the backwards numbering
convention of [8] with a= x36 till z= x11 and then we use specific capital letters M =
x10 till V = x1. This avoids some “special” capital letters following notations used
2 Block size could be increased and our attacks and methods would work all the same.
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since the 1970s [16,35,31]. We consider that each round of encryption is identical
except that they can differ only in some “public” bits called F (and known to the
attacker) and some “secret” bits called K also known as S1, or L also known as S2.
Even though these bits ARE different in different rounds we will omit to specify
in which round we take them because our work is about constructing one round
invariants (extending to any number of rounds). This framework covers most block
ciphers ever made except that some ciphers would have more “secret” or “public” bits
in one round. The capital letter Z is a placeholder for substitution of the following
kind
Z(e1,e2,e3,e4,e5,e6)
where e1 . . .e6 will be some 6 of the other variables. In practice, the ei will repre-
sent a specific subset of variables of type a-z, or other such as L. Later Z (and maybe
another letter like W ) needs to be replaced by a formula like:
Z← Z00+Z01∗L+Z02∗ c+Z03∗Lc+ . . .+Z62∗ ckl f h+Z63∗Lckl f h
where Zi j are coefficients of the Algebraic Normal Form (ANF).
3.1.1 Polynomial Invariants
We are looking for arbitrary Boolean polynomial invariants. For example say
P(a,b, . . .) = abc+abd+acd+bcd+ . . .
could be an invariant after 1 round. In this space some solutions are considered
as trivial and are easy to find, for example when P is a simple product of linear
invariants cf. Appendix of [8]. For this reason some early papers on this topic em-
phasised complex irreducible polynomials which were considered both less trivial
and harder to discover. One of the main points in discovery of innovative attacks on
block ciphers is that non-trivial attacks with irreducible polynomial invariants of de-
gree higher than 2 are actually at all possible, and how to construct some (rather than
just discover accidentally). In fact we do NOT and should not restrict our attention to
irreducible polynomials. A fundamental point is that even when P is just a simple
product of linear invariants, it is possible that the linear invariants will not work and
only their product works. Or that we can subsequently remove the simpler invariants
(!). Several examples of this are shown in this paper.
4 A Constructive Approach Given the Cipher Wiring
We consider an arbitrary block cipher3. Our attack methodology starts4 from a given
block cipher specified by its ANFs for one round. Specific examples are shown for
T-310, an old Feistel cipher with 4 branches. This cipher offers great flexibility in the
choice of the internal wiring so that we can possibly make some adjustments if we
3 It could also be a stream cipher where the state is transformed in a bijective way in the same way as
in an unbalanced Feistel cipher, or a stream cipher based on a block cipher.
4 Our approach is to find invariant attack starting from arbitrary rounds ANFs is at the antipodes
compared to [11,12] where the ciphers are very special.
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do not find a property we are looking for. Most block ciphers such as DES or AES
also have this sort of flexibility in the choice of P-boxes, arbitrary invertible matrices
inside the S-box, inside the mixing layers, etc. However there is only one such cipher
(to the best of our knowledge) in which a high degree of flexibility in the choice of in-
ternal wiring is officially allowed, and was used to encrypt real-life communications.
In original T-310 cipher machines the wiring of the cipher would be changed once
per year [14]. Arbitrary changes in this wiring including some extremely weak ones
[17] are possible, and will be entirely compatible with original historical hardware.
4.1 On Feistel Ciphers
The question of non-linear invariants in Feistel ciphers in particular was first studied
by Knudsen and Robshaw at Eurocrypt’96 cf. [25]. The authors have actually claimed
that this approach cannot or will not work for Feistel ciphers. This type of impossi-
bility claim is, well simply fake news, or an incorrect interpretation of [25]. There is
no doubt non-linear invariant attacks CAN be made to work for Feistel ciphers.
One type of attack was shown in a later paper presented at Crypto 2004. The con-
cepts of Bi-Linear and Multi-Linear cryptanalysis were subsequently introduced [10,
11,20] in order to work with Feistel ciphers with two and several branches specif-
ically. There are however indeed some serious difficulties in making such attacks
work. One of them is that great majority of attacks work only for a fraction of key
space, which was already clearly visible in the work of [10]. In this paper and other
recent work however we show that this difficulty can be overcome entirely for T-310
cipher: the attack will work for any key (!). For other ciphers such as DES, the prob-
lem remains, see for example Thm. 11.6 in [9] and Section 1.1 in [26] and Section
5.2. in [6] which seems to suggest that one cannot have an attack which would not
make some assumption on the key. We believe indeed that for some ciphers we will
maybe never find a really good attack in this respect however our results on T-310 in
this paper and other in [8] suggests that one can be more optimistic: indeed different
attack for different keys can overlap and the same polynomial invariant can be ob-
tained in many different ways [factorization for Boolean polynomials is not unique
cf. [18,19]].
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5 Specification and Boolean Polynomial Representation of T-310
The block size is 36 bits and the key has 240 bits. We number the cipher state bits
from 1 to 36. The bits 1,5,9 . . .33 are those freshly created in one round, cf. Fig
5.1. All the input bits with numbers which are NOT multiples of 4 are shifted by 1
position, i.e. bit 1 becomes 2 in the next round, and bit 35 becomes 36.
Fig. 5.1 T-310: a peculiar sort of Compressing Unbalanced Feistel scheme cf. [29,14].
We denote round inputs by x1, . . . ,x36 and the outputs will be y1, . . . ,y36. One
round of encryption can be described as 36 Boolean polynomials of degree 6, cf. Fig.
5.2 below. Each round involves two key bits K,L and one round constant bit F which
is derived from an IV of 61 bits which is transmitted in the cleartext. The initial key is
defined as s1...120,1...2 ∈ {0,1}120·2 which is 240 bits. The non-linear part of our cipher
are W (),X(),Y (),Z(), which are four identical Boolean functions which operate on
four disjoint sets of 6 variables.
In T-310 the specification of the internal wiring of the cipher is called an LZS
or Langzeitschlu¨ssel which means a long-term key. We simply need to specify two
functions D : {1 . . .9} → {0 . . .36}, P : {1 . . .27} → {1 . . .36}. For example D(5) =
36 will mean that input bit 36 is connected to the wire which becomes y17 after XOR.
Then P(1) = 25 will mean that input 25 is connected as the 2nd input of Z() also
known as v1 in Fig. 5.3. The equation (f1) means that we apply a special convention,
where the key bit K is used instead of one of the D(i) by specifying that D(i) = 0.
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yi+1 = xi for any i 6= 4k ( with 1≤ i≤ 36) (r0)
y33 = F + xD(9) (r1)
Z1
de f
=Z(L,xP(1),. . . ,xP(5)) (z1)
y29 = F +Z1+ xD(8) (r2)
y25 = F +Z1+ xP(6)+ xD(7) (r3)
Z2
de f
= Y (xP(7), . . . ,xP(12)) (z2)
y21 = F +Z1+ xP(6)+Z2+ xD(6) (r4)
y17 = F +Z1+ xP(6)+Z2+ xP(13)+ xD(5) (r5)
Z3
de f
= X(xP(14), . . . ,xP(19)) (z3)
y13 = F +Z1+ xP(6)+Z2+ xP(13)+L+Z3+ xD(4) (r6)
y9 = F +Z1+ xP(6)+Z2+ xP(13)+L+Z3+ xP(20)+ xD(3) (r7)
Z4
de f
= W (xP(21), . . . ,xP(26)) (z4)
y5 = F +Z1+ xP(6)+Z2+ xP(13)+L+Z3+ xP(20)+Z4+xD(2) (r8)
y1 = F +Z1+ xP(6)+Z2+ xP(13)+L+Z3+ xP(20)+Z4+xP(27)+xD(1) (r9)
x0
de f
= K (s1)
F ∈ {0,1} is a round constant depending on a (public) IV ( f 1)
K = sm mod 120, 1 (in encryption round m = 0,1,2, . . .) (k1)
L = sm mod 120, 2 (in encryption round m = 0,1,2, . . .) (k2)
Fig. 5.2 The specification of one round of T-310, cf. also Fig. 5.3 and Fig 7.2.
Fig. 5.3 The internal structure inside one round of T-310
5.1 Variable Naming and Polynomial Invariants
In order for our polynomials to be short and compact we sometimes replace the 36 bits
x1− x36 by single letters, cf. Fig. 5.4. We avoid certain letters like F used elsewhere.
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We study polynomial invariants for one round with 36 variables. Therefore variables
xi and yi are treated “alike” and can be called be the SAME letter, for example x36 = a
and then y36 = a also. If we want to avoid ambiguity, we will distinguish between the
variable a at input denoted by ai or just a, and the same variable at output denoted by
ao or aφ where φ is a short notation for one round of encryption.
Fig. 5.4 Variable naming conventions
5.2 The Substitutions
When later in this paper we use some concrete LZS (for example LZS 551 which is
specified later) this leads to replacing variables and to some simplifications, as shown
in the example below. For example y25 is l and if D(7) = 20 then xD(7) becomes q, etc,
and we get l← F +Z1+O+q. This can be interpreted as one round of encryption is
equivalent to replacing l and all the other letters by our exact formulas, for example
with LZS 551 we get the following substitutions:
a← b
b← c
c← d
[. . .]
Z1← Z(L, t,S,d,y,M)
l← F +Z1+O+q
[. . .]
Z4←W (w,u,a,h,e,n)
[. . .]
V ← F +Z1+O+Z2+q+L+Z3+ i+Z4+ k+ j
6 The Fundamental Equation (FE)
In order to break our cipher we need to find a polynomial expressionP say
P(a,b,c,d,e, f ,g,h, . . .) = abcdi jkl+ e f g+ e f h+ egh+ f gh
using any number between 1 and 36 variables such that if we substitute in P
all the variables by the substitutions defined we would get exactly the same poly-
nomial expression P , i.e. P(Inputs) =P(Output ANF) are equal as multivariate
polynomials. We obtain:
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Definition 6.1 (Compact Uni/Quadri-variate FE) Our “Fundamental Equation (FE)”
to solve is to make sure that sum of two polynomials like:
FE =P(Inputs)+P(Output ANF)
reduces to 0, or more precisely we are aiming at FE = 0 for any input, or in other
words we want to achieve a formal equality of two Boolean polynomials like
P(Inputs)+P(Transformed Outputs) = 0
or even more precisely
P(a,b,c,d,e, f ,g,h, . . .) =P(b,c,d,F +m, f ,g,h,F +Z1+ e, . . .)
where Z1−Z4 will be later replaced by Boolean functions Z(),Y (),X(),W ().
Alternative Notation. There is also another notation which is more like notations
used in classical invariant theory. Instead of writing
FE =P(Inputs)+P(Transformed Outputs)
we can also write:
FE =P+Pφ
where
Pφ
de f
= P(φ(Inputs)) =P(Transformed Outputs)
which is the same as above, and we can also write:
P i
de f
= P
Po
de f
= P(inputsφ )
where φ is the transformation induced by 1 round of encryption and where φ(Inputs)
denotes a sequence of 36 polynomial expressions of output-side variables (a, . . .V )
expressed as Boolean function of the 36 input-side variables [with some extra vari-
ables such as secret key variables]. For example the variable a is replaced by poly-
nomial b and d by F +m. In other words they are written as formal polynomials
in B36 corresponding to the ANF expressions of one round of encryption (and as a
function of inputs of this round). Our usage of exponents is similar as in the math-
ematical (Hilbertian) invariant theory. Our exponents can be simply interpreted as
transformations on polynomials, or more precisely as operations belonging to a cer-
tain group of transformations acting on a set of Boolean polynomialsP or A or other
say (azM+ b) ∈ B36 where B36 is the precise ring of all Boolean polynomials in 36
variables named a−z and M−V as in this paper. The notationPφ is very elegant and
unhappily ambiguous or not always well-defined. This is because in general φ de-
pends also on F and various key bits. Then it happens thatPφ is likely to be unique
nevertheless: we are aiming at computingPφ primarily and precisely in cases where
the result, the transformed and substituted polynomialPφ is such that the final result
Pφ does NOT depend on the variables F,K,L (!). This may and will become possible
when our polynomialP is particularly well chosen.
In the next step, Z will be represented by an Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) with
64 binary variables which are the coefficients of the ANF of Z, and there will be
several equations, and four instances Z,Y,X ,W of the same Z:
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Definition 6.2 (A Multivariate FE) At this step we will rewrite FE as follows. We
will replace Z1 by:
Z← Z00+Z01∗L+Z02∗ j+Z03∗L j+ . . .+Z62∗ jh f pd+Z63∗L jh f pd
Likewise we will also replace Z2:
Y ← Z00+Z01∗ k+Z02∗ l+Z03∗ kl+ . . .+Z62∗ loent+Z63∗ kloent
and likewise for X = Z3 and W = Z4 and the coefficients Z00 . . .Z63 will be the same
inside Z1−Z4, however the subsets of 6 variables chosen out of 36 will be different
in Z1−Z4. Moreover, some coefficients ofP may also be variable.
In all cases, all we need to do is to solve our FE equation for Z, i.e. determine 64
binary variables Z00 . . .Z63. This formal algebraic approach, if it has a solution, still
called Z for simplicity, or (P,Z) will guarantee that our invariant P holds for 1
round. This is, and in this paper we are quite lucky, IF this equation does not depend
on three bits F,K,L. This is the discovery process of [8].
In this paper we do NOT use this process. We will work by attack hopping. From
one attack we will derive the existence of another attack on a different cipher wiring
(i.e. a different LZS). Thus we completely avoid all the most difficult questions in
[8]: Do such equations have any solutions? If they have, can the solution be the same
for several permutations simultaneously so that our attack can work in presence of
key bits, round constants, IV bits etc? We concentrate on transposing some work-
ing attacks to another cipher setup or where the Boolean function is modified. No
systematic method to study all possible invariant attacks is known and possibly such
method does not exist due to double-exponential explosion in the number of possible
polynomial invariants.
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7 KT1 Keys and Higher Degree Invariant Attacks
Many polynomial invariants on block ciphers published so far are of low degree,
mainly of degree 2 [10,8,36] and finding any such invariants was quite difficult.
Many examples presented are also quite artificial because they have little to do with
any encryption systems used to encrypt real-life communications. The East German
government cryptologist have mandated that for an LZS to be approved for “official”
use, it must satisfy a certain very complex specification called KT1 which takes one
full page to describe, cf. Appendix B in [14]. Therefore we expect that it is substan-
tially harder to find an attack on a KT1 key. Our starting point will be some simple
invariants from [8] which actually work for a genuine KT1 key, something consid-
ered very hard to do until recently. There are approximately 283 possible KT1 keys,
cf. Section 5.4. of [17] while there are approximately 2170 possible5 LZS keys. The
reader can therefore imagine that the attacks we present here for KT1 keys are sub-
stantially harder to find than most of earlier attacks on T-310 such as found in [8]:
numerous technical constraints must be satisfied simultaneously.
It is known that about 3 % of KT1 keys can are extremely weak w.r.t. Linear
Cryptanalysis, cf. [15]. Inside the remaining 97 % of cases, can a KT1 key be vulner-
able to a non-linear invariant attack? The answer is that in some cases yes, as we are
going to show later.
7.1 Starting Point: A Peculiar Quadratic Attack on a KT1 Key
551: P=17,4,33,12,10,8,5,11,9,30,22,24,20,2,21,34,1,25,
13,28,14,16,36,29,32,23,27 D=0,12,4,36,16,32,20,8,24
P = eg+ f h+ eo+ f p+gm+hn+mo+np
with this shortP the Fundamental Equation FE will have very few terms:
P(a,b,c,d,e, f ,g,h, . . . ,V ) =P(b,c,d,F +m, f ,g,h,F +Z+O,
. . . ,F +Z+O+Y +q+L+X + i+W + j+K)
(Y +m)(g+o) = 0
and one solution which makes our cipher weak is Z = 1+d+e+ f +de+cde+de f .
The fact that our FE contains none of F,K,L implies that our polynomial P is an
invariant which works for any key and any IV and for any number of rounds.
It may seems that (Y +m)(g+o) = 0 was obtained by some sort of accident, later
we will see why this attack works, cf. later Thm. 7.3 and Fig. 7.1. Before that we
need to make a number of observations. We abstract our FE from notations used for
the whole cipher, and look at the inputs of our Boolean function. Then our FE can
be re-written as the following “annihilation requirement” using Z+ f , where f is an
input of Z, and Z + f must be annihilated by a linear term d + e, and d,e are also
inputs of Z:
(Z+ f )(d+ e) = 0
5 A quick estimation is
(36
27
) ·27! · (369 ) ·9! ·36≈ 2170.
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7.2 An Essential Insight
It is easy to see thatP is irreducible and no linear attack exists for this cipher setup.
Interestingly we haveP = AC+BD where:
A
de f
= (e+m) = x32+ x24
B
de f
= ( f +n) = x31+ x23
C
de f
= (g+o) = x30+ x22
D
de f
= (h+ p) = x29+ x21
Now do A,B,C,D have any concrete significance for our cipher? To see this let us
consider a yet simpler case when Z(a,b,c,d,e, f ) = f . Then it is possible to check
that our cipher would have 4R linear invariant D→C→ B→ A→D which however
is totally absent when Z = 1+d+ e+ f +de+ cde+de f .
Fig. 7.1 Connections between that four linear factors used in our invariant attackP = ABCD.
If we go back to a non-linear Boolean functions, inside D→ C→ B→ A→ D
we have 3 trivial transitions which are always true and one “impossible” transition
A→ D which is no longer correct (unless Y is equal to its last input).
7.2.1 Eliminating the Output of Boolean Function Y
Interestingly, on Fig. 7.1 we “almost” have A→ D transition, the difference Ai +Do
is actually equal to the output of Boolean function Z2 which is also denoted as Y
plus an affine function. This is due to internal wiring in LZS 551 and can be checked
either by applying equations of one round in Section 5, or much more easily by sim-
ply summing bits on a path going from in output 21 to 29 through bits numbered
D(6),D(8),P(6) and the output Y precisely in Fig. 7.2. Here bits D(8),P(6) cancel,
D(6) connects to input bit 32, and bit 32 goes to 6-th input f of Y (). Now in some
sense in our attacks we are allowed to consider that Y + f behaves as it was zero.
More precisely, we are going to see that Y + f and later Y + e can be annihilated in
different ways, more or less trivial in different attacks inside this paper. We will first
revisit our attackP = AC+BD and show why and when it works.
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Looking at Fig. 7.1 we are now able to abstract the attack on key 551 which was
first discovered in [8] and we can propose a more general result and attack. Our attack
corresponds to a sum of products of all polynomials lying on two disjoint sub-cycles
of length 2 which form a partitioning of the whole cycle.
7.2.2 A More General Result Beyond LZS 551
An important insight is that in order for AC+BD to be invariant we need to show
that:
Po = AoCo+BoDo = AiCi+BiDi =P i
and due6 to the structure of our cycle we always have one transition which is
trivial:
BiDi = AoCo
therefore it remains to show that for any input for 1 round we have:
BoDo = AiCi
moreover we have another trivial property Ci = Bo and our equation boils down
to:
Ci(Do+Ai) = 0
This is and will be achieved in our [previous and generalized] attack using two
neatly distinct assumptions. First we are going to make sure through the cipher wiring
that we have the transition with addition of Y + f or similar as depicted on the left
hand side of Fig. 7.1, we aim at having:
(Do+Ai) = Y (its 6 inputs)+ (some linear combination of these 6 inputs)
Then we are going to make sure that this affine modification of our Boolean func-
tion Y + f or similar will be annihilated by polynomial Ci. More precisely we show
that:
6 Which in turn is due to bit shifts k→ k+1 for any k 6= 4 j inside our cipher, cf. Fig. 5.1.
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Theorem 7.3 (KT1 compatible invariant) For each long term key s.t. D(8) = P(6),
D(6) = 32 and P(10) = 30, P(11) = 22 and P(12) = 24, if the Boolean function is
such that (Z+ f )(d+e) = 0 and for any short term key on 240 bits, and for any initial
state on 36 bits, we have the non-linear invariantP = AC+BD true with probability
1.0 for any number of rounds.
Proof: We first show how (Do +Ai) can be equal to a sum of Y () and some of its
inputs. We XOR two equations (r2) and (r4) from the formulas of Fig. 5.2 in Section
5 which specify our cipher:
Do = y29+ y21 = F +Z1+ xD(8)+F +Z1+ xP(6)+Z2+ xD(6)
then we have D(8) = P(6) and two terms cancel and we get:
Do = xD(8)+ xP(6)+Z2+ xD(6) = Y ()+ xD(6)
and we check that D(6) = 32 and therefore we have:
Do = Y ()+ x32
which knowing that Ai = x24+ x32 becomes in turn
Do = Ai+Y ()+ x24
where x24 is the same as last input f for this Boolean function, due to P(12) = 24.
The same result can be obtained following the path going from in output 21 to 29
through bits numbered D(6),D(8),P(6) and the output Y in Fig. 7.2. Finally we also
check that (Y + x24)Ci = 0 is the same as (Z + f )(d + e) = 0 due to Ci = x30 + x22
and P(10) = 30, P(11) = 22 and P(12) = 24. uunionsq
Fig. 7.2 The internal structure of one round of T-310 block cipher.
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7.2.3 Downgrading Our Invariant:
Now we show that our non-linear attack hides the existence of a yet simpler attack
with a degenerated Boolean function. To shows this we observe that input f of Y
is P[12] = m, i.e. last input of Z2 is precisely connected to m with LZS 551. What
happens if Y = m i.e. Z = f ? We have another degenerated solution of our FE being
(Y +m)(g+o) = 0 and we have in fact found a root for a proper factor (Y −m) = 0
of our previous FE.
Next Step. An interesting question is can we do this in a reverse direction? Find a
cipher setup where the FE is a multiple of (Y −m)(g+o) = 0 ? Yes!
7.3 Construction of Higher Degree Invariants
Such invariants if they exist are NOT uniquely determined, they may depend on the
choice of the Boolean function Z in the previous step (!). For the current pair LZS,Z
as above we found that the followingP of degree 4 also works:
P = e f gh+ f ghm+ eghn+ghmn+ e f ho+ f hmo+ ehno+hmno+
e f gp+ f gmp+ egnp+gmnp+ e f op+ f mop+ enop+mnop
where in fact P = ABCD. Interestingly, no other invariants being polynomi-
als in A,B,C,D exist. We conjecture however that no invariants other than AC+BD
(irreducible) and ABCD (not irreducible) exist for 1 round7 and probably not in gen-
eral8. For sure we have verified that no linear invariants exist here for LZS 551 and
Z = 1+d+ e+ f +de+ cde+de f .
7.3.1 Study of FE
IfP = ABCD what is the FE? A quick computation gives
mBCD = Y BCD
This decomposition implies that any solution Z which is a solution to the previous
FE will also work here but NOT vice versa.
7 For 2 rounds we have closely related invariants AC→ BD→ AC with AC and BD being invariants for
4 rounds. All these do not use F,K,L either.
8 In fact it is hard to be sure, no method to explore all possible invariants with 36 variables at higher
degrees is known and possibly such method does not exist
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7.4 A More Autonomous Example of An Invariant of Degree 4
Until now we have seen that a weak cipher with linear invariants A,B,C,D shared
the same non-linear invariants with a cipher where the only attacks are the non-
linear ones AC+BD and ABCD. Is it possible to remove the first attack and keep
the second? Yes and it is requires minimal change. We recall that AC+BD will be an
invariant each time our Boolean function satisfies:
YC = mC
and in order for ABCD to be an invariant, Z needed to satisfy:
mDCB = Y DCB
All we have to do now is to find a solution Y which satisfies one FE and not the
other FE! For example we can find a solution to an alternative equation:
mB = Y B
which is different than the most trivial solution Y (......) = m and which then will
satisfy only the first equation mDCB = Y DCB. One example of such solution is Y =
1+ n+ nm+ f +m f using the same variable names. A better solution is to modify
LZS 551 very slightly: we just need to make sure that letters f and n are actually
inputs of Y . Only two modifications are needed. Here is a solution found by a SAT
solver:
558: P=17,4,33,12,10,8,23,24,31,25,16,10,20,2,21,34,
1,25,13,28,14,16,36,29,32,23,27 D=0,12,4,36,16,32,20,8,24
Z(a,b,c,d,e,f)=1+a+ab+c+bc
We have checked that no other invariants at degree up to 3 exist with all the 36 state
variables for 1,2,3,4,5, . . . and various numbers of rounds. All simple invariants were
removed with the new Boolean function and only ABCD is left.
7.5 A Yet Stronger Example
One step further, we try to find a non-trivial (proper) solution to:
mBC = Y BC
Here we will need to use as inputs of Z all the 5 variables which appear in this
equation. A nice trick to quickly find a solution which is a “proper” root of (m+Y )BC
is to first create a new equation FE ′ which implies the previous one by multiplying
both sides by B, yet at the same time FE ′ actually imposes the presence of the two
variables f ,n in B, and another 6− th variable, for example:
(Y +m)( f +n) = (Rn f +R f )go
Again just one invariant ABCD remains after changing the Boolean function but
now our Boolean function must use 6 quite specific variables which must be con-
nected to inputs of Z2 = Y . One possible solution is as follows:
550: P=17,4,33,12,10,8,22,23,24,31,30,20,20,2,21,34,
1,25,13,28,14,16,36,29,32,23,27 D=0,12,4,36,16,32,20,8,24
Z(a,b,c,d,e,f)=1+b+c+d+aef+abef
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8 A Transposed Attack with Two Cycles
We want to further modify this attack in order to make it stronger. We consider a
method (found with help of our research assistant Matteo Abbondati) to imitate or
transpose the current attack by designing two independent cycles of length 4 based
on the same principle as on Fig. 7.1. We would like two such cycles to exist simulta-
neously for the same cipher wiring. We define:
Fig. 8.1 Two cycles with 4+4 linear factors and 2 invariant attacks withP = ABCD andP = EFGH.

A
de f
= (q+ i) = x20+ x28
B
de f
= (r+ j) = x19+ x27
C
de f
= (s+ k) = x18+ x26
D
de f
= (t+ l) = x17+ x25
E
de f
= (u+O) = x16+ x8
F
de f
= (v+P) = x15+ x7
G
de f
= (w+Q) = x14+ x6
H
de f
= (x+R) = x13+ x5
Here one example of LZS constructed to satisfy the conditions of Fig. 8.1 is:
443: 9,19,33,7,10,3,18,26,17,30,4,25,28,2,21,34,1,11,
15,8,14,6,13,29,12,5,27 D=24,16,36,12,20,32,4,8,28
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Here the inputs of W are in order
18,26,17,30,4,25
and inputs of Y are in order
14,6,13,29,12,5
A quick computation shows that the Fundamental Equation for P = ABCD is
exactly equal to:
BCD(S+Y ()) = 0
which can be rewritten as, if we call a,b,c,d,e, f the inputs of Y :
(x19+ x27)(a+b)(c+ f )(e+Y (a,b,c,d,e, f )) = 0
ForP = EFGH the Fundamental Equation is equal to:
FGH(y+W ()) = 0
which can be rewritten as, if we call a,b,c,d,e, f the inputs of Y :
(x15+ x7)(a+b)(c+ f )(e+W (a,b,c,d,e, f )) = 0
From here it is easy to see that we can make both equations vanish simultaneously
if we have:
∀a,b,c,d,e, f (a+b)(c+ f )(e+Z(a,b,c,d,e, f )) = 0
for our Boolean function used twice as both Y and W . Here is an example of a
Boolean function which works: Z = 1+ a+ bc+ abc+d+ abd+ acd+ bcd+ be+
abe+ ce+ bce+ abce+ ade+ abde+ acde+ f + a f + ac f + bc f + ad f + bd f +
abd f +e f +be f +abe f +ce f +bce f +ade f +acde f . Moreover, a random Boolean
function will satisfy this equation with probability 216, cf. Thm C.2 in Appendix C in
[9] or Section 5 in [19]. In this attack, it easy to see that in addition to two invariants
of degree 4, an invariant of degree 8 also exists. More precisely, a product of two
invariants for a block cipher is always an invariant. Therefore P = ABCDEFGH
is also an invariant with LZS 443 and any Boolean function which satisfied our FE
equation as above.
9 Removing Lower-degree Invariants and Increasing the Degree in Our
Annihilation Requirement
We have further modified the LZS and the Boolean function so that invariants of
degree 4 disappear and only one invariant of degree 8 remains.
P = ABCDEFGH
this is achieved for a modified cipher wiring as follows:
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444: P=17,1,33,2,10,3,18,26,19,27,36,5,16,32,21,34,8,
25,13,28,14,6,15,7,12,23,30 D=24,20,4,12,8,32,36,16,28
where the inputs of W are in order
18,26,19,27,36,5
and inputs of Y are in order
14,6,15,7,12,23
The main principle is that we disconnect the two cycles in Fig. 8.1 and connect
them to make one single cycle. This is done by literally exchanging the two values
of D(5),P(13) with D(2),P(20) which has the effect to combine the two cycles, cf.
Fig. 9.1. The constraints D(7) = P(11) and D(4) = P(25) remain unchanged. Then
we verify that the new wiring gives a bijective round function (which is not obvious).
Fig. 9.1 Connections between the 8 linear factors used in our second attack withP = ABCDEFGH.
Now we compute the Fundamental Equation (FE).
FE =P(Inputs)+P(Transformed Outputs) =P+Pφ
We start by observing that, following the path from output 13 to 5 in Fig. 7.2, or
adding together the equations (r6) and (r8) in Fig. 5.3 we get:
Ho = y13+y5 = xD(4)+xP(20)+W (.)+xD(2)=(W ()+xP(25))+(x28+x20)= (W+e)(.)+A
i
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Here by (W +e) we denote a modified Boolean function with addition of the 5-th
input bit. Then following the path from output 25 to 17 in Fig. 7.2, or adding together
the equations (r3) and (r5) in Fig. 5.3 we get:
Do = y25+y17 = xD(7)+Y (.)+xP(13)+xD(5)=(Y (.)+xP(11))+(x16+x8)= (Y +e)(.)+E
i
We have then:
FE =P+Pφ = AiBiCiDiE iF iGiH i+AoBoCoDoEoFoGoHo =
FE = AiBiCiDiE iF iGiH i+BiCiDi((Y + e)(.)+E i)F iGiH i((W + e)(.)+Ai) =
Now we have only input-side variables and we can drop the i notations:
FE = BCDFGH ( AE + [(W + e)(.)+A][(Y + e)(.)+E] )
which can be rewritten as:
FE = BCDFGH ( E(W + e)(.)+A(Y + e)(.)+(W + e)(.)(Y + e)(.) )
We will now discard factors such as D which have variables not used as inputs of
our Boolean functions W,Y . In contrast knowing that inputs of W are 18,26,19,27,36,5
the polynomials B,C are legitimate potential annihilating factors for W . Similarly, the
inputs of Y are 14,6,15,7,12,23 and F,G can be used. It is then easy to see that one
way to annihilate the FE equation above is to have simultaneously:{
BC(Y + e) = 0
FG(W + e) = 0
which also will insure the annihilation of our third term with BCFG(W + e)(Y +
e) = 0. Knowing that these Boolean function are identical We obtain two identical
annihilation requirements being exactly:
(Z+ e)(a+b)(c+d) = 0
One solution is
Z = f edcb+ f edca+ f edc+ f ecba+ f ecb+ f eca+ f ec+ f eba+ f eb+ f ea+ f e
+ f db+ f d+ f cb+ f c+ f b+ f + edcb+ ed+ ec+dcb+dca+da+d+ cb+a+1
Remark. The same invariant attack with LZS 444 also appears inside [21]. This
paper and [21] can be seen as two radically different ways to eventually obtain the
same attack. We believe that the fact that the same attack can be obtained in a many
different ways is very interesting. It is not a bug but rather an feature. The possibility
to obtain the same attack in many distinct ways already occurs inside the framework
of [21] where we multiply different polynomials (and factorisation is not unique).
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10 Results Achieved and Discussion
Very few non-linear attacks are known and working examples are valuable. An in-
variant attack of degree 8 is potentially extremely hard to find or detect, therefore we
achieve a stronger attack than before. It is also substantially stronger in terms of the
manipulation of the Boolean function required to make this attack work. It is easy to
see we are closer to an attack which could work for an arbitrary Boolean function. In
order for the attack above to work, all which we need to do is to make sure that Z = e
in 24 cases out of 26. These 24 cases correspond to the truth table entries for Z such
that (a+b)(c+d) = 1. All the other 26−24 truth table entries can be arbitrary9.
This shows that a block cipher setup such as LZS 444 can be backdoored by
manipulating only a fraction of entries in a truth table of Z. A recent paper shows that
with another invariant of degree 8 and another LZS wiring this fraction can be yet
smaller, cf. [9].
10.1 Open Problems
There is still a long way to go in order to actually break T-310. For KT1 keys we
designed an attack of degree 4, however the Boolean function is quite weak. then we
presented an attack of degree 8 under assumption that (Z+e)(a+b)(c+d)= 0 which
works for stronger Boolean functions however the long-term key is no longer KT1. In
order to break our cipher with the original Boolean function we need rather an attack
which would work with annihilators with 3 linear factors like Z(a+b)c(1+e)= 0, cf.
[14]. An example of such an attack can be found in [9] however then again the LZS
wiring is not KT1. Moreover it is possible to see that current attack constructions
(here and in [9]) lead to attacks where the annihilating factors involve 2 variables
such as (a+ b) which eliminate F , and it is more difficult to construct attacks with
annihilating factors such as c(1+e). It appears that T-310 disposes of a good security
margin and only weaker cipher setups can currently be attacked. Or we need to find
better attacks.
10.2 The Question of Key Bits
There exist numerous interesting vulnerabilities in T-310. For example, the key splits
in two parts which are used in a completely different way, and many other potentially
serious vulnerabilities, some of which are listed in Section 28.2 of [14]. In non-linear
invariant attacks it iq quite interesting to see that almost all attacks studied so far do
not involve any key bits, with very few exceptions (cf. Section 9.1 in [8] We have
simply not yet studied the full spectrum of attacks and attacks which involve key bits
could be very useful, cf. last sub-section in [15]) and Section 4.11 in [8]. In relation to
this question, one anonymous referee for this paper have written the following words:
9 Or, better, they can be modified to rebalance the Boolean function, or/and satisfy all sort of desired
cryptographic properties such as high non-linearity etc.
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[...] when we look carefully at the conditions, it appears that the first boolean
function Z only takes 5 variables [...] and specifically one bit of the secret key. Mean-
ing that the secret key only intervenes in a LINEAR way between the first round and
the second round, I believe other very powerful attacks will appear. [...]
It is an open problem how this property could be exploited in cryptanalysis of T-310.
We should not ignore the fact that the same key bit L is also used again, just before
Z3, cf. Fig. 7.2. However any variable can potentially be eliminated in an invariant
attack.
11 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates a novel invariant hopping technique. An attack on a patho-
logically weak cipher setup (with a linear Boolean function!) is transposed to break
another stronger cipher. In several steps we remove the trivial attacks and keep less
trivial ones. The complexity and algebraic degree for the invariant and the Boolean
function, and the number of variables needed increase progressively. At the end we
obtain an invariant of degree 9 and no invariant of lower degree.
We also show that when the degree of the invariant grows, in order to make such
attacks work one needs to manipulate only a small fraction of the entries of the truth
table of the Boolean function. This means there exist invariant attacks which are
highly compatible with most known security and non-linearity criteria on Boolean
functions [30]. In other words, the attack presented in this paper is not prevented by
the traditional methodology used in block cipher design and analysis. This in turn
means that we need more work on anti-invariant resistance in block ciphers cf. [4,37,
7]. Extremely few attacks in symmetric cryptanalysis ever invented work when the
number of rounds is very large.
26 Nicolas T. Courtois
References
1. Ange Albertini, Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Maria Eichlseder, Florian Mendel and Martin Schla¨ffer:
Malicious Hashing: Eve’s Variant of SHA-1, in SAC 2014, pp.1-19, Springer LNCS 8781.
2. R. Aragona, A. Caranti, M. Sala: The group generated by the round functions of a GOST-like cipher,
Ann. Mat. Pura Appl., 196 (2016), 1-17.
3. Arnaud Bannier, Nicolas Bodin, and Eric Filiol: Partition-Based Trapdoor Ciphers, https://ia.
cr/2016/493.
4. C. Beierle, A. Canteaut, G. Leander, Y. Rotella: Proving resistance against invariant attacks: how to
choose the round constants, in Crypto 2017, Part II. LNCS, 10402, pp. 647–678, Springer 2017.
5. C. Beierle, A. Canteaut, G. Leander: Nonlinear approximations in cryptanalysis revisited, in IACR
ToSC, 2018(4):80-101.
6. Tim Beyne: Block Cipher Invariants as Eigenvectors of Correlation Matrices, in Asiacrypt 2018, pp.
3-31. One version is also avail. at https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/763.pdf
7. Marco Calderini: A note on some algebraic trapdoors for block ciphers, last revised 17 May 2018,
https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08151
8. Nicolas T. Courtois: On the Existence of Non-Linear Invariants and Algebraic Polynomial Construc-
tive Approach to Backdoors in Block Ciphers, https://ia.cr/2018/807, last revised 27 Mar 2019.
9. Nicolas T. Courtois: Structural Nonlinear Invariant Attacks on T-310: Attacking Arbitrary Boolean
Functions, https://ia.cr/2018/1242, revised 12 Sep 2019.
10. Nicolas Courtois: Feistel Schemes and Bi-Linear Cryptanalysis, in Crypto 2004, LNCS 3152, pp.
23–40, Springer, 2004.
11. Nicolas Courtois: The Inverse S-box, Non-linear Polynomial Relations and Cryptanalysis of Block
Ciphers, in AES 4 Conference, Bonn May 10-12 2004, LNCS 3373, pp. 170–188, Springer, 2005.
12. Nicolas Courtois: The Inverse S-box and Two Paradoxes of Whitening, Long extended version of
the Crypto 2004 rump session presentation, Whitening the AES S-box, Available at http://www.
minrank.org/invglc_rump_c04.zip. Main theorem appears in Appendix B of the extended ver-
sion of [11].
13. Nicolas Courtois and Willi Meier: Algebraic Attacks on Stream Ciphers with Linear Feedback,
Eurocrypt 2003, Warsaw, Poland, LNCS 2656, pp. 345–359, Springer. Extended version: www.
nicolascourtois.com/toyolili.pdf.
14. Nicolas T. Courtois, Klaus Schmeh, Jo¨rg Drobick, Jacques Patarin, Maria-Bristena Oprisanu, Matteo
Scarlata, Om Bhallamudi: Cryptographic Security Analysis of T-310, Monography study on the T-310
block cipher, 132 pages, received 20 May 2017, last revised 29 June 2018, https://ia.cr/2017/
440.pdf
15. Nicolas Courtois, Marios Georgiou and Matteo Scarlata: Slide attacks and LC-weak keys in T-310, in
Cryptologia, vol 43, Iss. 3, 2019, pp. 175–189.
16. Nicolas Courtois, Jo¨rg Drobick and Klaus Schmeh: Feistel ciphers in East Germany in the communist
era, In Cryptologia, vol. 42, Iss. 6, 2018, pp. 427-444.
17. Nicolas Courtois, Maria-Bristena Oprisanu and Klaus Schmeh: Linear cryptanalysis and block cipher
design in East Germany in the 1970s, in Cryptologia, 05 Dec 2018, https://www.tandfonline.
com/doi/abs/10.1080/01611194.2018.1483981
18. Nicolas T. Courtois, Aidan Patrick: Lack of Unique Factorization as a Tool in Block Cipher Crypt-
analysis, Preprint, https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.04684 12 May 2019.
19. Nicolas T. Courtois, Aidan Patrick, Matteo Abbondati: Construction of a polynomial invari-
ant annihilation attack of degree 7 for T-310, To appear in Cryptologia in 2020, DOI =
10.1080/01611194.2019.1706062.
20. Nicolas Courtois: Data Encryption Standard (DES), slides used in GA03 Introduction to Cryptography
and later in GA18 course Cryptanalysis taught at University College London, 2006-2016, http:
//www.nicolascourtois.com/papers/ des_course_6.pdf
21. Nicolas T. Courtois, Matteo Abbondati, Hamy Ratoanina, and Marek Grajek: Systematic Construction
of Nonlinear Product Attacks on Block Ciphers, In proc. of ICISC 2019, LNCS 11975 Springer, 2020.
22. Tony Crilly: The rise of Cayley’s invariant theory (1841-1862), In Historia Mathematica, Vol. 13, Iss.
3, August 1986, pp. 241–254
23. C. Harpes, G. Kramer, and J. Massey: A Generalization of Linear Cryptanalysis and the Applicability
of Matsui’s Piling-up Lemma, Eurocrypt’95, LNCS 921, Springer, pp. 24–38.
24. C. Harpes, J. L. Massey: Partitioning cryptanalysis, In FSE 97, LNCS 1267, pp. 13–27, 1997.
Invariant Hopping Attacks on Block Ciphers 27
25. Lars R. Knudsen, Matthew J. B. Robshaw: Non-Linear Characteristics in Linear Cryptoanalysis, Eu-
rocrypt’96, LNCS 1070, Springer, pp. 224–236, 1996.
26. Gregor Leander, Brice Minaud and Sondre Rønjom: A Generic Approach to Invariant Subspace At-
tacks: Cryptanalysis of Robin, iSCREAM and Zorro, In Eurocrypt 2015, pp. 254–283.
27. G. Leander, M.A. Abdelraheem, H. AlKhzaimi, E. Zenner,: A cryptanalysis of PRINTcipher: The
invariant subspace attack. In Crypto 2011, LNCS 6841, pp. 206–221, 2011.
28. Pawel Morawiecki: Malicious Keccak, https://ia.cr/2015/1085
29. Jacques Patarin, Vale´rie Nachef, Coˆme Berbain: Generic Attacks on Unbalanced Feistel Schemes with
Contracting Functions, in Asiacrypt 2006, pp. 396–411, LNCS 4284, Springer 2006.
30. Joan Boyar, Magnus Find, Rene´ Peralta: Four Measures of Nonlinearity, In Algorithms and Complex-
ity, CIAC 2013, LNCS 7878, pp. 61-72, Springer,
31. Referat 11: Kryptologische Analyse des Chiffriergera¨tes T-310/50. Central Cipher Organ, Ministry
of State Security of the GDR, document referenced as ‘ZCO 402/80’, a.k.a. MfS-Abt-XI-594, 123
pages, Berlin, 1980.
32. Ralph Wernsdorf: The one-round functions of the DES generate the alternating group, In proc. of
EUROCRYPT92, LNCS 658, pp. 99–112, Springer, 1993.
33. R. Sparr and R. Wernsdorf: Group theoretic properties of Rijndael-like ciphers, In Discrete Appl.
Math, 156 (2008), 3139-3149.
34. Kenneth G. Paterson: Imprimitive Permutation Groups and Trapdoors in Iterated Block Ciphers, In
FSE 1999, pp. 201–214, Springer 1999.
35. Klaus Schmeh: The East German Encryption Machine T-310 and the Algorithm It Used, In Cryptolo-
gia, vol. 30, iss. 3, pp. 251–257, 2006.
36. Yosuke Todo, Gregor Leander, and Yu Sasaki: Nonlinear invariant attack: Practical attack on full
SCREAM, iSCREAM and Midori64, In Journal of Cryptology, pp. 1–40, April 2018.
37. Yongzhuang Wei, Tao Ye, Wenling Wu, Enes Pasalic: Generalized Nonlinear Invariant Attack and
a New Design Criterion for Round Constants, In IACR Tr. on Symm. Crypt. Vol. 2018, No. 4, pp.
62-79. https://tosc.iacr.org/index.php/ToSC/article/view/7361/6531
